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Abstract
Through technical discussion of oxyfuel retrofit of Meri-Pori’s supercritical power plant (565MWe net), it was
recognized that a deep analysis of the risks associated with the retrofit solution would be necessary for learning more
about oxycombustion technology and to clarify the actual risks. As the result of the risk analysis, it was concluded that
oxyfuel retrofit and oxyfuel operation would only involve low magnitude risks. This paper describes methodology of
the risk analysis and major results including mitigation methods of the risks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over several years, FORTUM conducted a technology analysis that would allow carbon capture at
Meri-Pori supercritical power plant (565 MWe, net) owned by FORTUM and TVO and operated by
FORTUM. One option was to modify the plant to oxyfuel combustion as offered in spring 2009
by BABCOCK-HITACHI and AIR LIQUIDE, who jointly developed a technical solution in cooperation
with FORTUM for Meri-Pori.
It was agreed between FORTUM, BABCOCK-HITACHI and AIR LIQUIDE that a deeper
analysis of the risks associated with the oxyfuel retrofit would be necessary for learning more about
oxycombustion technology and to clarify the actual risks.
This paper will highlight the most important conclusions of this joint effort. The three companies
not only dedicated one week in the Plant to conduct the risk analysis, they also allocated significant
resources in the following weeks and months to better assess the probability and criticality of all the risks
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4 – Not Critical / Acceptable magnitude
3 – Low / moderate magnitude
2 – Significant magnitude
1 – Critical
Critical risk that can’t be tolerated / Intolerable magnitude
RISK CRITICITY TABLE
Maximum Gravity PROBABILITY
= Mini of (C; U; S; E) 1 2 3 4
1 1 1 2 3
2 1 2 3 4
3 2 3 4 4
4 3 4 4 4
induced by modifications of the power plant equipment use and/or the addition of new pieces of
equipment. Several mitigations measures will be highlighted in this paper.
2. METHODOLOGY
Fortum, Babcock-Hitachi and Air Liquide formed a team of experts on all units impacted by the
retrofit to oxyfuel combustion. Fortum risk assessment experts chaired the discussion and defined the
methodology.
The team met for one week to elaborate the risk analysis on the power plant site. The first day was
dedicated to the construction of a functional analysis that served as the basis of the risk assessment during
the following days.
The team evaluated every identified impact on each piece of equipment existing in the power
plant. All failure scenarios of new pieces of equipment such as improper oxygen and flue gas mixing in the
mixing device, loss of oxygen production or pressure or purity (from Air Separation Unit), etc. were
considered in the study as potential sources of new risks for the power plant.
The risk analysis focused on the following four kinds of risk:
 Safety,
 Environment,
 Costs and
 Unavailability of power (for sale).
The risk criticality results from the combination of a probability (ranking from 1 – highly probable
– to 4 – highly unlikely) and a gravity (ranking from 1 – highest consequences – to 4 – acceptable
consequences). The criticality matrix is summarized in Figure 1. The levels 3 and 4 relate to acceptable risk
magnitude.
Figure 1 Criticality ranking and matrix
The preliminary results were then challenged by Fortum and TVO managers.
3. MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE RISK ANALYSIS
The team met several times to improve the coherence and applicability of the risk analysis. Many
statements were then backed by internal experience from Hitachi and Air Liquide. Sources of evidence
were experimental oxycombustion tests, engineering studies and actual industrial references. Fortum risk
assessment specialists were involved in all updating of the initial risk analysis.
The risk analysis team conclusion is that oxyfuel retrofit and oxyfuel operation at the Meri-
Pori coal fired power plant would only involve low magnitude risks and no critical risk at all.
Appropriate design, operation and maintenance procedures following international best
practices from the relevant industries are necessary but sufficient to reduce all potential risks to the
acceptable and manageable levels (categories 3 and 4 with the lowest criticality).
The risk analysis expert group recognized several serious risk scenarios with high impacts either
in failure costs, duration of unavailability, personnel or environmental safety. However, all of those risk
scenarios were evaluated with low probability (criticality in level 3 out of 4, 4 being fully manageable
risks). Those risks were:
 ASU energy release (e.g., explosion)
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 Anoxia or toxic exposure risks due to ASU or CPU waste stream venting
 Boiler and or mill explosion
 Risks raised by a new working environment for operators
They are going to be further discussed in this paper.
4. MAIN RISKS DETAILED DESCRIPTION
4.1. Damaged ASU
4.1.1. Risk Description
The cryogenic production of oxygen introduces a risk of explosion in case of hydrocarbon
accumulation in liquid oxygen. In most cases, these explosions do not breach the process equipment and
therefore do not pose a risk to personnel. Industry documents cite only three (3) major ASU explosions in
the past fifty (50) years in which the process equipment has been breached causing major equipment
destruction and risk to personnel
1
. (references: European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA) or
Compressed Gas Association (CGA) publications [1,2,3]).
The gravity is indeed very serious as process equipment and vessels can be destroyed. In fact,
some accidents have led to fatalities. In any case the loss of production and the repair costs rank in the
highest gravity zone.
4.1.2. Impact of Facility Siting
Some industrial environments can increase the risk of safe operations of ASUs. ASUs located in
the vicinity of petrochemical facilities (e.g., hydrocarbon processing plants, refineries, etc) increase these
risks through the possibility of hydrocarbons’ gaseous phases entering the ASU process streams through
the inlet air feed. Nonetheless, ASUs can be located at these petrochemical facilities and their safe
operation assured with the appropriate design features and operating practices. ASUs have also been
installed at Integrated Gasification and Combined Cycle (IGCC) facilities where there could be a presence
of hydrogen and/or syngas (as illustrated in Figure 2 Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). Air
Liquide has commissioned more than 9 ASUs in IGCC plants in the past 15 years; all of them of a nominal
capacity higher than 1500 t/d of oxygen production.
It should be noted that in the case of coal fired power plants, this risk is significantly reduced as
the hydrocarbon fuel is in a solid particulate form and may be effectively filtered from the feed air prior to
being introduced to the process streams.
4.1.3. Risk Mitigation Measures
The air separation industry has been aware of these hydrocarbon risks and has well documented
industry practices such as EIGA and CGA documents (op. cit.). Several barriers are known to be effective
in adequately mitigating this risk and can be summarized as follows:
1. Effective air filtration. For the case of units placed in coal handling areas, proper care must be
taken in selecting the appropriate level and design of this filtration as well its orientation with respect to the
coal storage/processing areas.
2. Proper design and operation of the air Front End Purification (FEP) unit. Designed to remove
water and CO2 from incoming feed air, this unit effectively adsorbs potentially hazardous hydrocarbons
preventing their introduction into downstream process equipment.
1
It should be noted that these accidents occurred within an accumulated 30 000 years of operation
experience which brings the average incident frequency rate to the level of 10
-4
.
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3. A continuous liquid oxygen purge ensuring that any hydrocarbons that have been ingressed by
the ASU are adequately deconcentrated.
4. Continuous analysis and monitoring of the liquid oxygen within the process equipment with
appropriate measures in the case that safe limits are exceeded (e.g., plant shutdown).
Figure 2: ASU integrated in an IGCC plant
4.1.4. Risk Criticality = 3
Extensive studies have led to the development and implementation of Design Safety Standards
within AL Group to mitigate the risk at a very low level.
With the latest understanding of hydrocarbons risks, and using the most current design and
operating practices, the frequency rate for hydrocarbon incidents can be managed to a level of
approximately 10-6.
Criticality for this combination of probability and impact is 3 (moderate magnitude).
4.2. Anoxia and Toxic Gas Inhalation.
4.2.1. Description of Risk, Mitigation and Similar Experience
Both ASU and CPU process gases could lead to anoxia to personnel (CO2, nitrogen, argon). The
operation of both units includes normal venting as well as exceptional venting in case of plant trip. All
waste streams are directed to safe locations and away from personnel. It is not necessary to send these
waste streams to the power plant stack. The venting scenarios for the ASU and CPU will be studied on
each project taking into account specific site conditions and operating modes (e.g., adjacent building
arrangements, local temperatures, etc.). Specific dispersion modeling for each stream for all modes are
done using dedicated validated software.
The air separation industry has many experiences in mitigating the risks of anoxia to plant
personnel and established best practices for design and plant operation that are well recognized.
Similarly, power plant industry has equally well established design and operation practices for
mitigating the toxic and anoxia risks for the flue gas desulphurization plant where inert (CO2 and nitrogen)
and toxic (SO2) gases are processed.
ASU
Gasifier
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4.2.2. Risk Criticality = 3
Proper design, operating and maintenance procedures and personnel training allow for safe
operation of ASU and CPU. Therefore the probability of accident is extremely limited and the lowest level
(4) of probability is estimated to be conservative. Criticality for this combination of probability and impact
is 3 (moderate magnitude).
4.3. Boiler Explosion
4.3.1. Risk Description of Boiler Explosion
Explosion occurs when enough ignition energy is given after establishment of combustible
mixture of fuel and air (or oxygen rich gas). Usually boiler is operated with continuous stable combustion
under proper operating conditions. If all flames are lost due to improper fuel / air ratio, improper coal
grinding, and so on, and if the boiler operation is continued after all flame lost without boiler trip,
combustible mixture is established in the furnace and boiler enclosures. Under this condition, if an operator
puts ignitor(s) in service by mistake for example, explosion occurs. This phenomenon is the same for air
combustion and oxyfuel combustion. Probability of such superposed undesired conditions is extremely
low.
Average oxygen concentration for oxyfuel combustion is planed to be controlled at 27 to 28 % by
volume on a wet basis. In consideration of this setting, influence of oxygen concentration on explosive
limit has been evaluated by laboratory test. The result shows that, minimum explosive dust concentration is
higher in oxygen and CO2 mixture than in air under the oxygen concentration of 32 % (highest
concentration in the laboratory test) as shown in Figure 3. It means that combustibility is lower in oxyfuel
condition than in air condition under the tested oxygen concentration range. If oxygen concentration is
deviated from normal operating condition (27 to 28 %) to a higher value such as 35 % (preliminary), boiler
is tripped. So, under usual operating range, oxyfuel condition has lower potential of explosion than in air
condition.
Characteristic of temperature rise of fuel particle is an important factor used for evaluation of
combustibility. Figure 4 is an illustration of this characteristic comparing oxyfuel condition and air
condition. Even if very high oxygen condition happens in oxyfuel condition as shown in Figure 4 Case B,
as an impractical assumption, combustibility is better in oxyfuel condition than in air condition. It means
that the potential of all flame lost is lower in oxyfuel condition than in air condition.
To maintain combustibility in the oxyfuel condition of Case A of Figure 4 NR-LE Burner is
applied. NR-LE Burner has been developed and applied to lignite firing boilers, in which low oxygen flue
gas is used as transporting (primary) gas. Flame stability of NR-LE Burner was evaluated in 4MW oxyfuel
combustion test, and it was confirmed that flame stability is maintained at very low oxygen concentration
in primary gas (10 %.wet) as shown in Figure 5 .
Most important matter to prevent boiler explosion is to avoid formation of uncontrolled
combustible mixture without flame. From this point of view, provision of flame detector system and boiler
trip interlock based on flame detector signal is highly recommended. With the addition of this system to
Meri-Pori power plant, the risk of boiler explosion is much lower in oxyfuel condition than in air condition.
4.3.2. Risk Mitigation of Boiler Explosion
To prevent improper condition of oxygen concentration, the following safeguards are
considered:
1. One flow element and three differential pressure transmitters for measurement of oxygen and
recirculation gas flow;
2. Alarm by oxygen concentration (calculation based on flow measurement);
3. Boiler trip by oxygen concentration (2 out of 3) (calculation based on flow measurement) 
Shut off (close or stop) the redundant 8 shut off devices (all, without prioritization) when oxygen
concentration is higher than 35% (preliminary):
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4. Alarm by oxygen concentration measurement after mixing point;
5. Addition of flame detector system including boiler trip interlock based on flame detector signal.
Figure 3 (left) Comparison of minimum explosive dust concentration between oxyfuel and air
conditions
Figure 4 (right) Effect of O2 concentration on temperature rise of particle
Figure 5 Confirmation of flame stability of NR-LE Burner
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4.3.3. Risk Criticality = 3
Probability of accident due to the simultaneous failures of the above exactly superposed protection
systems is close to zero, however, the criticality remains equal to 3 according to the criticality matrix.
4.4. Sulfuric Acid Corrosion
4.4.1. Risk Description
Oxyfuel system has recirculation gas duct and potential of corrosion by sulfuric acid (H2SO4) due
to concentration of SO3 and temperature reduction of recirculation gas by mixing oxygen.
4.4.2. Risk Mitigation
Hitachi has developed a unique flue gas treatment system with gas cooler before EP, which has
been applied to actual boilers as shown in Figure 5. This system is applied to oxyfuel retrofit as well. By
reducing recirculation gas temperature below 90 °C, SO3 concentration is reduced below 1 ppm, under
which corrosion can be negligible and carbon steel used. (See Figure 6 and 7). This consideration leads to a
criticality of the level 3.
Figure 5 EP Inlet Cooler System applied to Air Combustion
Figure 6 (left) Reduction of SO3 by Installation of Cooler before EP
Figure 7 (right) Corrosion Rate Depending on SO3 Concentration
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4.5. Boiler performance and auxiliary equipment
Risks of oxyfuel retrofit for boiler performance and auxiliary equipment such as pulverizers, SCR,
EP, FGD, air heater, fans and so on are also evaluated. As the result, there is no impact on these by the
retrofit. As an example, evaluation result of impact on heat transfer characteristic is described below.
It is confirmed by combustion tests and numerical analysis that the existing heating surfaces of
waterwall, superheaters, reheaters, and economizers can be used for oxyfuel mode as they are. By adjusting
oxygen concentration in the combustion gas (mixture of oxygen and recirculation gas), current heat
exchange rate can be maintained as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8 Analysis of heat absorption in each heating surface
5. GENERAL CONCLUSION
This work enabled Fortum, Babcock-Hitachi and Air Liquide to confirm that oxycombustion is a
real option for coal power plants.
 It is SAFE
 It is SUITABLE for RETROFIT
 It can offer SIMILAR RELIABILITY to air fired power plants
 Oxyfuel is a near ZERO EMISSION process :
no SOx, no NOx, no dust, no mercury emissions
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